The air traffic controllers raised many good points and salient observations. For example, when the words “tombstone safety” are typed into the Google search engine, the FAA comes up as a chronic offender. The term “tombstone safety” is typically applied to an organization that corrects a hazard after, not before, lives are lost.

As one attendee remarked, “I’m a frustrated controller because I’m ignored on safety issues.”

There were four of five FAA officials on hand to get this message. The most prominent was Hank Krakowski, the recently appointed chief operating officer of the Air Traffic Organization (ATO), the FAA fiefdom responsible for air traffic control. Krakowski was clearly present on a fence-mending mission. “I’m trying to rebuild the participation of NATCA as we move forward,” he vowed in a lunchtime address.

The panels convened to discuss sundry safety problems were uniformly good. NATCA’s Darren Gaines, speaking on the runway safety panel, noted that aircraft cross runways approximately 1,800 times a day. In this context, Gaines expressed what he called “Newton’s sixth law,” to wit, “The one who is most complacent during ground operations has the greatest chance of being on the evening news” as a result of a runway accident.

And Bruce Landsberg of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), speaking on the same panel, noted that the FAA has tested for a year now at Long Beach a system to improve runway safety, but there is little sign of the system being deployed nationally.

The system he was talking about is the Final Approach Runway Occupancy Signal (FAROS), which alerts with flashing lights pilots on final approach if the runway they are planning on using is occupied. FAROS provides direct and immediate warning, and is the response to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) “Most Wanted” recommendation for a direct warning to pilots of an impending runway incursion. The NTSB has color-coded its recommendation red to signify that the FAA has not acted promptly on its recommendation.

Patrick Forrey, NATCA president, delivered an assessment of the current situation. As Forrey remarked, the air transportation system in the United States is projected to handle a billion passengers by 2016, but the next generation (NextGen) air traffic control system, being designed to handle this projected crush in traffic, won’t be operational until 2020. Meanwhile, he noted, “Delays are likely to be worse this summer” compared to last year and “We are down to our lowest number of fully qualified controllers since 1992.”

Forrey’s remarks were most sobering about the present and future. Given his trenchant insights, the bulk of his remarks follow:

“You know, the ATC [air traffic control] system is entering the most active period on the calendar – spring and summer travel and convective weather. …

“And regrettably, I must also tell you that we are rapidly losing too many of [our] most experienced controllers, along with too many of our brightest, newest young trainees.

“The FAA’s continued efforts to push out experienced controllers in favor of low paid new hires is very troubling to me; and should be for all of you.

“It leaves an impression that cost cutting trumps a proven way of ensuring the highest margin of safety. I'm not sure if you all know this, but America's air traffic controllers have an ongoing contract dispute with the FAA.

“America's air transportation network is, to use an overused phrase, at a crossroads. The FAA estimates that annual passenger levels will exceed one billion by 2016. But NextGen's most important component won't be here until 2020. And today, 12 years out from the full implementation of ADS-B [Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast], delays have grown worse each of the past two years while our controller workforce is depleted.

“Air traffic controllers have been working under the FAA’s imposed work rules for 576 days, eight hours and 18 minutes. Yes, we do keep an official count-up clock. And no, we will never forget that the FAA abandoned a fair collective bargaining process, and tore apart the already tenuous relationship it had with its controller workforce. This is the open, bleeding wound we are desperately trying to repair, for the sake of the safety and stability of the system. But, we are faced with an employer chasing after us with a salt shaker.

“There is little trust left between controllers and FAA management. The imposed work rules included unpopular changes to annual leave policy, removed career advancement opportunities, established new pay bands that decreased controller wages, eliminated rest periods, and left many controllers dissatisfied with their work environment.

“As a direct result of this, the total number of fully certified controllers has fallen to a 15-year low. Nationwide, more than 2,200 controllers and trainees left their jobs between Oct. 1, 2006 and Jan. 5, 2008. That’s roughly one out of every seven in the workforce. Only 17 of the 911 controllers that retired last year reached the mandatory age of 56.

“In order to cope with the shortage, the FAA is calling in regular overtime, and operating shifts without proper staffing, including at some of the nation’s busiest facilities like Southern California TRACON [Terminal Radar Approach Control] and Atlanta Hartsfield Jackson Tower.

“This creates fatigue, which the NTSB [National Transportation Safety Board] and the GAO [Government Accountability Office] have identified as a serious safety concern. … Controllers’ days and weeks are longer, as is their time on position, which puts dangerous stresses on their mental and physical limits. Operational errors have increased at facilities where the staffing shortage is most severe.

“The FAA’s own data indicates that serious runway incursions are up dramatically this fiscal year over a similar period last year. Incredibly, the FAA’s defense in the media is that only a small number of these incursions involved commercial jetliners. This suggests the lives aboard private and business aircraft are somehow less noteworthy than those on board an RJ [regional jet] or larger aircraft. We take strong exception to that. Communication between the tower and cockpit is crucial for all flights.

“The FAA had hoped to handle the high rate of attrition by replacing those that leave with new hires. However, it has proven impossible to hire and train new controllers quickly enough to handle the outflow.

“Nationally, trainees make up a staggering 25% of the workforce. It was 15% just one year ago. Additionally, at over 60 facilities, trainees make up 35% or greater of the workforce.  This has led to a degraded and ineffective training program. For example at Miami Center, new hires have to wait as many as 18 months before receiving any upgrade training due to critically low staffing.

“And just a few miles to the west of here at Chicago Center, the FAA is trying to shorten the training process from three years to 18 months for the same reason, forcing inexperienced controllers into work situations they may not be ready for. The results thus far are very troubling. The facility has reached the FAA’s fiscal year 2008 limit for maximum allowable operational errors in just six months.

“And now the FAA is placing new hires with little to no experience into our busiest terminal facilities that are unequipped and unprepared for training a novice. This is like taking a pitcher out of high school and starting them at Yankee Stadium.

“The FAA knows its imposed work rules have failed. That is why it has begun offering $24,000 bonuses to veteran controllers to try and keep them from leaving. It hasn’t worked. This fiscal year’s attrition total is on track to shatter FAA projections by a wider margin than even last year’s record exodus of over 1,600.

“But the controllers I represent are professionals who despite enduring these long and difficult days have fallen back on the only thing they have left: Each other. It’s a bunker-like mentality, of sticking together and looking out for one another, and finding ways to keep the system moving as safely as possible.

“This is what we like to describe as the NowGen.  Today’s challenges demanding immediate attention. But as we all know, a considerable amount of time, money and resources are being devoted to NextGen. The FAA has attempted to take the first step in a 20-year plan to transform ATC from a ground to a space-based system. While NATCA is on record as endorsing any technological advance to improve air traffic control operations, NextGen, as presently conceived, cannot.

“And, as we learned recently with stakeholder comments to the FAA’s plan for implementing ADS-B, there are many others with concerns as well. The Air Transport Association said the FAA’s proposal, quote, ‘calls for a Porsche when a Chevy can do the job.’ AOPA [Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association] urged the FAA to go back to the drawing board.  And the Aircraft Electronics Association described the proposed system as, quote, ‘ADS-B on steroids.’

“Plan advocates point to new technology as a way to overcome the limiting factors of weather and runway capacity. For us controllers, time is measured in distance, and one minute equals three miles of separation. So, regardless of how closely spaced aircraft are on approach, only one every minute, under ideal circumstances, can land.  It is unlikely that FAA will be in the position to prove which side is right, however, because NextGen is an all-or-nothing proposition.

“Which leads me to this question: What is NextGen?

“I’m not even sure that the head of the JPDO [Joint Program Development Office] could explain what NextGen is. I certainly don’t know what it is, aside from a loaded buzzword, full of hype and PR [public relations] value, but lacking in substance. Meanwhile, back in the real world, the NowGen is being neglected. Just ask controllers in Miami, Memphis and Northern California who had to deal with major equipment outages just a couple of weeks ago.

“Here’s what I do know: Until every aircraft flying in U.S. airspace is equipped, and all ATC elements are transitioned from ground to space, benefits will remain unknown.

“Compounding the effort’s complexity is the agency’s decision to lease, not own, the ADS-B infrastructure. As the [Department of Transportation] Inspector General has stated, FAA has never before relied on a service contract for introducing revolutionary technology into the National Airspace System.

“There is little doubt that the FAA is embarking on a risky journey with an unproven vehicle. With that being said, NATCA proposes a balanced, practical approach to transitioning from NowGen to NextGen. Thirty projects form NextGen’s building blocks, and total over $17 billion dollars. The FAA must focus its resources and management attention on completing these, and other modernization initiatives vital to NowGen.

“More significantly, these projects can ease congestion and delays, and confer needed safety and efficiency benefits immediately, to an ATC system under significant stress. First, we need to review ground radars, communications networks, oceanic automation platforms, and other system upgrades to ensure adequate backup and redundancy. All ATC modernization procurements should require complete and full government oversight and testing, of vendor hardware, software, and system performance standards.

“Next, we need to expedite delivery of ASDE-X [Airport Surface Detection System], the safety-critical ground radar technology that has widespread support among pilots, controllers, and airport operators. In addition, all medium- to large-sized airports should be covered by runway detection technology. At a minimum, at least 60 would qualify.

“FAA should also reinstitute its CPDLC [controller-pilot data link communications] program for data transfer between pilot and controllers, to add another means of runway communications when frequencies are congested.

“New color-coded taxiway monitoring systems should be deployed, allowing controllers to more precisely track pilot deviations from assigned taxiways during periods of peak traffic or bad weather.

“We must also finish terminal automation.  The FAA must quickly determine the end state for the nearly 100 radar facilities without STARS [Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System] or Common ARTS [Automated Terminal Radar System], and move expeditiously to upgrade them.

“Many of these sites face life limits on older technology, and decisions to consolidate or upgrade must be made now.  NATCA should be involved in any facility relocation decisions which have safety and operational impacts.

“The FAA should also fully fund and complete the system-wide deployment of controller automation technologies like URET [User Request Evaluation Tool], and should move aggressively to automate tower and TRACON flight planning, scheduling, and data tracking procedures, by fielding technology that can fully integrate these functions into NAS [National Airspace System] operations.

“Here’s a big step we propose: Complete oceanic modernization. The agency should expand ATOP [Air Traffic Oceanic Procedures] to all five sectors in Anchorage. Additionally, all remaining system trouble reports and software upgrades at all three centers should be expeditiously managed, so that full functionality is achieved.

“Outstanding communications problems due to data link and ADS [Automatic Dependent Surveillance] that affect Oakland must be resolved, and a complete overhaul and rewrite of the Oceans 21 training program implemented.

“Additionally, a better first step for NextGen might be the early application of ADS-B for oceanic surveillance. Unlike the high cost, long lead time, technical risk, and uncertain value of ADS-B implementation in airspace already covered by radar, oceanic ADS-B is an order of magnitude less complex and less expensive. Once in use, it can offer immediate relief to the heavily congested airports in the New York metropolitan area, especially during times of inclement weather.  ADS-B can effectively remove the wall we know as the Atlantic Ocean.

“The FAA should also immediately install backup and redundant communications lines and switches, for air traffic services considered critical under the old LINCS [the FAA’s former telecommunications system] system, but that are now unprotected under FTI [the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure].

“NATCA’s bottom line is this: We believe that Congress should call for an immediate, comprehensive evaluation of NextGen, before additional funds to implement it are expended.  Until a re-appraisal is completed, FAA should suspend all ADS-B contract activities.

“As recommended by the Inspector General, the agency should, at a minimum, establish an interim architecture for what can be accomplished at the front end of the program, perhaps by 2015. This would better define costs and transition strategies. 

“Air traffic controllers welcome new technology. In fact, we demand it. If traffic demands continue to rise, then we want to have the best possible tools at our disposal, to keep those planes moving quickly and safely through our airspace.

“The FAA has received bipartisan criticism from Congress for not involving us in the modernization process. We recognize that collaboration is critically important, because when controllers are not involved, safety problems occur. At Atlanta Center last month, there was a near miss involving two aircraft circling in overlapping holding patterns at the same altitude. This was a grossly unsafe procedure that resulted from the FAA not involving NATCA in the process of developing procedures for the new runway.

“While the FAA tries to unfairly disparage us publicly as a hostile labor union, the men and women who perform this job are highly skilled, dedicated and honest professionals, who genuinely love what they do and only seek to be treated with fairness and respect. …

“It is essential that positive relationships between labor and management exist, if the United States is to lead the world in innovation and productivity.

“In that vein, the new FAA COO [Chief Operating Officer], Hank Krakowski … has communicated to me that controller involvement in modernization, procedures and other safety matters is imperative for Agency success. I look forward to working closely with Hank to turn the current situation around, and begin building trust between labor and management, because until we get there, the system will suffer.

“Without a strong, motivated, and well-staffed air traffic control system, all the high tech equipment in the world counts for little. …”

In response to Forrey’s observations, Krakowski said simply, “I take your comments seriously.”

While recent years marks a period of great safety (in terms of the low number of fatal accidents), Krakowski said, “We all know there is risk in the system.”

“I’m trying to rebuild the participation of NATCA as we move forward,” he said. “If your people are smarter than my technicians, that makes me happy.” Krakowski wants to exploit NATCA to make the system safer; this attitude marks a shift from ignoring the controllers to one of incorporating their concerns into the NextGen design.