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28 October 2008 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
FR Doc E8-25476 Docket No. FAA-2006-26722
Security Related Considerations in the Design & Operation of Transport Category Airplanes
Final Rule
This rule marks the end stage of a January 2007 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking dealing with airliners of more than 60 passenger seats or a takeoff weight of more than 100,000 pounds, proposing that new airplanes be designed to limit the effects of an explosive or incendiary device by:
1. Providing means to protect the flight deck and the passenger compartment from smoke, fumes, and noxious gases.
2. Requiring that fire suppression systems for cargo compartments be designed to withstand certain impacts and loads.
3. Designating a ‘least risk bomb location’ where a bomb discovered in-flight could be placed, so if it were to explode, flight-critical systems and structures would be protected as much as possible.
4. Ensuring redundant airplane systems for continued flight and landing following an explosion, primarily through separation of redundant critical systems (a 5-foot separation was proposed).
5. Designing the cabin in such a way so that it is more difficult to conceal weapons and explosives.
Summary of the final rule: The rule specifies design standards to protect the flight deck from forcible intrusion by persons or from penetration by small arms fire or fragmentation devices. It also requires the design to provide means to limit the effects of detonation by (1) limiting entry of smoke, fumes, and noxious gases into the flight deck and/or the passenger cabin; (2) meeting specified standards for all components of fire suppression systems in cargo compartments; (3) establishing a ‘least risk bomb location’; (4) physically separating certain redundant airplane systems; and (5) providing interior features that make it easier to detect explosives or weapons by a simple search of the cabin.
The rule generated 31 comments from aircraft manufacturers, airline associations, pilots unions and security experts, among others. Among the objections were the following complaints:
From Boeing and the Air Transport Association (representing most airlines in the U.S.): They claimed the rule wasn’t properly coordinated and, in any event, should be deferred or withdrawn.
Several commentators recommended the proposed requirements should also apply to all-cargo airplanes. The FAA disagreed, saying screening of personnel who board these aircraft should be sufficient.
A number of commentators recommended that the proposed requirements be applied not only to newly-manufactured aircraft but also should be retrofitted onto existing models. The FAA rebuffed this suggestion, saying bluntly: “We have no plan to extend any of these requirements to the existing fleet or existing type designs.”
A security expert, Billie Vincent, President & CEO of Aerospace Services International, Inc., recommended that a system of covert closed-circuit television (CCTV) be installed to monitor the cockpit, the cabin and the exterior of the airplane, with the ability to tap into the imagery at a ground station.
Vincent wrote:
“The purpose of these recommendations is to create a situation where cockpit crews have full views of the passenger cabin and the exterior of the aircraft. The intent of these systems is to provide the cockpit crew with as much intelligence as possible about events in the interior and exterior of the aircraft without having to leave the cockpit …
“The purpose of the capability to tap into the CCTV system from the ground is to provide the crisis managers and the U.S. Hostage Rescue Teams with data from inside a hijacked/hostage aircraft. Under the current situation the crisis managers and the Hostage Rescue Teams have to operate with a dearth of information on what is happening inside a hijacked airplane.”
The FAA claimed “there are numerous concerns (especially as to violations of privacy) associated with the use of such systems, and at this point the potential benefits of requiring video monitoring do not outweigh the concerns.” The argument the FAA made here was similar to the one the agency made in vetoing any rulemaking action on the National Transportation Safety Board’s recommendation for cockpit imagery recorders. And, as in the case of cockpit imagery recorders, the FAA has lost an opportunity to require CCTV on all future airliners.
Regarding separation of flight-critical systems, the FAA said:
“We considered the installation of systems near the fuselage contour, for example, in the crown of the airplane … In this area, a system could not be displaced beyond the contour of the fuselage, since the fuselage skin will not significantly deflect without failure. In those cases, the maximum displacement in the direction of the fuselage skin can be limited to that which would result in displacement outside the fuselage contour.”
The FAA claimed that the final rule passes the test of a cost versus benefits analysis:
“The cost of a fatal aircraft accident involving a terrorist bombing and hijacking can exceed one billion dollars. In addition to the direct costs of such an accident are associated costs of Congressional hearings, bankruptcy proceedings, and other litigation following an accident.”
Total costs for design, certification, and the added fuel burn associated with the extra weight are placed at $ 1.4 billion.
Total benefits in terms of resistance to terrorist attack and the “get home” ability of a bombed aircraft are placed at $ 2.7 billion.
Thus: $ 2.7/$ 1.4 billion yields a favorable cost-benefit ratio of almost 2:1.
Retrofitting the existing fleet of aircraft could well have pushed the total cost over $ 2.7 billion. In this case, a negative cost-benefit would have resulted and the final rule might not have been issued.
The rule is effective 28 November 2008. It does not apply to the Airbus A380 double-decker, as that airplane has been certificated and is now flying in revenue service. The rule may apply to Boeing’s new B787, as that airplane is still short of making its first flight.
(Comments on the NPRM may be found at www.regulation.gov; enter FAA-2006-26772 to get to the applicable entries in the docket.)
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