A new report highly critical of efforts to curb runway incursions blames much on the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) purported lack of leadership. In fact, this dire finding came from FAA officials, who told Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigators that the Office of Runway Safety has not had a permanent director for the past two years, that the staff has been cut from 66 to 37 people, that quarterly meetings have not been held with regional safety program managers, and that funding for the national office has been cut severely.

While a cause and effect relationship cannot be inferred from these cuts, it is interesting that the number of runway incursions has increased in 2007, after five years of a basically flat lined trend. The FAA is not making serious inroads into the incursion problem, and the reasons for the failure are documented in a November 2007 GAO report. The document basically charges that the FAA has not prepared a national runway safety plan since 2002 despite agency policy that it be updated every 2-3 years. Without a current plan, efforts within the FAA are “uncoordinated,” said the GAO.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which investigates aviation disasters, has declared runway safety a top concern. In its “Most Wanted” safety recommendations, it has called for a direct warning in the cockpit of a looming collision between two aircraft. The GAO report does not explain why this recommendation has been shortchanged by the FAA, which has preferred instead to provide warning to controllers, and to assess the effectiveness of red lights on the runway, which provide only an indirect alert to pilots.

However, the 86-page GAO report is useful from the standpoint of its comprehensive look at airport safety. The report examines three elements of the safety matrix, as it were: (1) runway incursions (which occur when any aircraft enters a runway without authorization), (2) runway overruns, which occur when an aircraft runs off the end of runways, and (3) operations in airport ramp areas where aircraft are serviced by baggage, catering and fueling vehicles and personnel (see Figure A). The GAO report also considered air traffic controller fatigue, which results from the shift schedule worked by controllers and by the overtime they frequently accumulate.

Figure A

Three areas where accidents can occur at airports. Underlying all three areas is the issue of air traffic controller fatigue.

Herewith, a brief summary of the GAO’s concerns:

Runway incursions.

Preventing runway incursions has been on the NTSB’s “Most Wanted” list of safety improvements since 1990 – 17 years now. The NTSB has called for a direct warning to pilots, as controllers have not always had sufficient time – a few seconds or less in some cases – to warn pilots of an impending incursion. There are also problems with the technology the FAA is deploying to provide that warning. Heavy precipitation can affect the radar on which the warning is based, resulting in false alarms and resultant loss of confidence in the system.

According to the GAO, the number and rate of incursions are increasing (see Figure B). The GAO indicated that progress has been stalled by a lack of organizational focus:

Figure B

The number and rate of runway incursions from fiscal year 1998 through 2007. The rate is defined as incursions per 1 million air traffic control tower operations, thereby accounting for the increase in air travel. The rate of incursions for 2007 is about 12% higher than during 2006 and is nearly as high as when the rate of incursions reached a peak in 2001.

“We found that the most recent national runway safety plan, issued in 2002, is no longer being used … FAA officials told us the national runway safety plan has been replaced by the FAA Flight Plan, which is a high-level planning document covering all of the FAA’s programs, with the goal of having each FAA office separately include its runway safety initiatives in its own business plan. [This course] does not have the same national focus and emphasis on runway safety that a national plan for runway safety provides.”

The FAA is deploying a radar-based system called ASDE-X at some airports to provide controllers with an alert of an impending incursion. However, nuisance and false alerts are endemic and relate to the site-specific environment at the airport. Thus, each ASDE-X system must be “tweaked” at the airport to minimize nuisance alerts and false alerts. FAA officials said new software is being deployed with the requirement not to generate more than two false alerts within 24 hours. Let the record reflect that this goal means not more than 730 false alerts in the course of a year – a number considered by some to be astonishingly high.

Such improved software was installed at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport in September 2007, and FAA officials said ASDE-X performance there was improved. The GAO said, “We were not able to confirm this information.”

Runway status lights, tested successfully at Dallas-Ft. Worth International Airport, are years away from being deployed nationwide.

The FAA also lacks complete data on each incursion, which means the most effective corrective measures addressing causal factors may not be applied. The GAO criticism here is simply devastating:

“An FAA program to obtain detailed information about the circumstance regarding runway incursions by administering questionnaires to pilots involved in incursions – the Runway Incursion Information and Evaluation Program – could help identify root causes of pilot deviations and provides a mechanism to obtain information that may not otherwise be reported. However, only 19% of pilots involved in runway incursions and surface incidents participated in the program during 2004 through 2006, and FAA did not provide any evidence that it analyzed the data that were collected.”

In other words, the FAA is sitting atop an unexploited “data morgue.”

One problem contributing to incursions is the issuance of multiple clearances to cross active runways. The NTSB believes a clearance should be issued from the tower for each runway crossing. The GAO report does not explore the feasibility of this recommendation.

The FAA is helping some airports with funding to construct end-around taxiways; these taxiways provide aircraft with access to gates without crossing active runways. One such perimeter taxiway was opened at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport in April 2007, but the GAO report provides no data on the effectiveness of this end-around taxiway at curbing incursions (see Figure C). Another such taxiway is scheduled to open at Dallas-Ft. Worth International Airport in October 2008.

Figure C

When an aircraft overruns the end of a runway during landing, the results can be serious. For example, in December 2005, a Southwest Airlines B737 overran the runway at Chicago’s Midway Airport during a snowstorm, ploughed through the airport fence, and collided with a car on the adjacent roadway, killing a child. The airport does not have the space for an overrun, so instead is installing an Engineered Materials Arresting System (EMASS) to halt overrunning aircraft.

Despite such laudable projects, the rate of runway incursions has not significantly decreased in the past five years. NTSB recommendations for clearance to cross each active runway, and direct warning to pilots of a threatened incursion, have not been implemented. Reasons why are not clear from the GAO report, but two thoughts come to mind: (1) the FAA is reluctant to require clearance to cross each runway out of an apprehension that this procedure will take time and thus erode airport capacity, and (2) the direct warning to pilots requires a technology the FAA has not developed.

Runway overruns.

The FAA has a requirement for a 1,000-foot unpaved safety area off the end of each runway to provide a buffer should an airplane overrun, undershoot, or veer off a runway. The NTSB has investigated 12 runway overruns since 2001 that resulted in 18 fatalities, and in many cases, the accident was related to the lack of an adequate safety area (see Figure D).

Figure D

An example of an accident in an airport ramp area. Not for nothing are airports known as “accident factories” and terms like “ramp rash” have come into vogue to highlight the chronic hazard. Undetected aircraft damage from ramp activities can cause in-flight emergencies. For example, in December 2006 an Alaska Airlines MD-80 experienced a sudden cabin depressurization after departing from Seattle. When the airplane returned to Seattle, it was discovered that a ramp vehicle had punctured the aircraft fuselage.

Many airports do not have 1,000-feet to spare. For those airports, the FAA is supporting the installation of an Engineered Materials Arresting System (EMAS), a bed of crushable concrete designed to stop overrunning aircraft.

Congress has mandated that all airports be in compliance with runway safety standards by 2015. Although not stated by the GAO, this Congressional requirement abets a stately, deliberate process that does not give any sense of urgency to the need for adequate safety areas or EMAS.

Furthermore, in October 2007 the NTSB recommended that the FAA require pilots to conduct landing distance assessments before every landing, based on aircraft performance data and actual conditions. As part of this recommendation, the NTSB said a 15% safety margin should be incorporated. The GAO noted, without explanation, that the FAA “has not yet responded to this recommendation.”

Terminals and ramp areas.

The GAO determined that there were 29 fatal ramp accidents from 2001 to 2006, primarily to airline support personnel. Ramp areas are typically congested with departing and arriving aircraft, baggage, catering and fueling personnel and their associated vehicles. Ground personnel usually work under considerable time pressure, creating an environment where injuries to people and aircraft damage can occur (see Figure E). What the GAO did not find was alarming. It did not find a complete record of non-fatal ramp accidents. The GAO did not find federal or industry-wide standards for ramp operations.

Figure E

The perimeter, or end-around, taxiway built at Atlanta’s airport eliminates about 560 runway crossing per day (roughly one third). Construction of these taxiways at other airports, space permitting, is under consideration.

Rather, the federal government has taken an indirect role in overseeing ramp safety. Airlines and airports typically control the ramp area using their own policies and procedures. The FAA expects to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking in 2008 concerning ramp operations, but such rulemaking could take years to complete.

Meanwhile, FAA officials told the GAO that they do not have responsibility for ramp safety and that their jurisdiction is limited to the movement areas. The GAO recommended that a plan for improved ramp safety, including “a discussion of roles and responsibilities” be developed, but it stopped short of urging the FAA to exercise oversight over ramp operations.

Air traffic controllers.

According to FAA data, as of May 2007, at least 20% of the controllers at 25 air traffic control facilities, including towers at several major airports, were working 6-day weeks, which could cause fatigue and resultant accidents and incidents in airport operations. The NTSB recommended a revision to work-scheduling policies so controllers’ sleep during off duty time would not be interrupted. Pending FAA discussions about this with the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), the GAO said FAA officials had “no plan” to mitigate the effects of controller fatigue.

On 10 December 2007 NATCA President Patrick Forrey requested an “emergency meeting” with Robert Sturgell, head of the FAA, to assess “what we can do together to restore system safety before tragedy occurs.” (See Figure F) Forrey and Sturgell are slated to meet on 21 December.

Of perhaps equal importance, the FAA needs to expand its Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) to include controllers. ASAP now includes pilots and flight attendants, and is a confidential, nonpunitive voluntary system for reporting safety risks. By expanding ASAP to include controllers, valuable insights could be gleaned regarding runway and airport safety incidents. According to the FAA, it signed a partnership agreement with NATCA regarding ASAP for controllers in October 2007. However, the FAA did not indicate when the plan would be implemented.

The GAO urged an ASAP for controllers, but it did not suggest that it be done on an expedited basis.

Rep. John Mica (R – Fla.), the ranking minority member of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, suggested that the root problem lies in Congress. The Congress needs to pass a critical aviation reauthorization bill containing important runway safety provisions rather than wasting valuable time criticizing the FAA’s efforts.

“It is the height of hypocrisy to criticize the FAA for not quickly putting in place runway and ramp safety technology, data collection processes, and staffing studies, while at the same time delaying passage of critical funding for these very initiatives in order to appease a favored special interest group,” Mica groused.

That may be so, but this view is not universally held. Senator Frank Lautenberg (D, N.J.), a member of the Commerce, Science & Transportation Committee, said, “A safe flight begins and ends on a safe runway, but the FAA is taking too many chances and ignoring too many red flags.”

Indeed, what emerges from the GAO report is a picture of inconsistent emphasis and management focus in the FAA going back many years. The FAA has not acted on the NTSB’s “Most Wanted” recommendations regarding runway safety, and it has been slow in implementing an ASAP program that would provide better information from controllers about why incursions and other hazards occur. The FAA would be well advised to heed these needs and to establish the goal of reducing incursions by 90% within five years. Any goal that establishes a 2015 deadline for runway safety standards is too far into the future, leaving key personnel unaccountable, and it depends on technology that has not yet been fully developed. (The complete report may be viewed at the GAO website, www.gao.gov; enter the report number, GAO-08-29)