A look at the1997 White House ‘Safer Skies’ challenge to reduce
commercial aviation fatal accident rates by 80% in ten years

On 1 October 2007, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will know how close it came to meeting the formidable challenge of improving the aviation safety record over a 10-year period. The goals were twofold: to reduce commercial fatal accidents by 80%, and to reduce overall accidents in all areas.

The FAA used Fiscal Years 1994-1996 to establish a baseline for 10 year fatal accident reduction calculations. The baseline included those fatal commuter airline accidents with over 10 seats that, as of 20 March 1997, began flying under Part 121 rules plus all Scheduled Part 135 (less than 10 seat) operations, mostly general aviation aircraft in Alaska and rural areas.

By Captain Thomas Duke (Ret.)

The FAA also chose to make the rate fatal accidents per million departures rather than per so many flying hours. The accident rate was expressed as a 3-year rolling average. This approach smoothes out the rate, which can fluctuate greatly in a year’s span by the presence or absence of one or two accidents – which makes assessments of progress difficult to perceive.  The accident recording began on 1 October 1997, the beginning of fiscal year 1998. The charts in this article are based on the first nine years of accident numbers, not rates. They deal with airliners with more than 10 seats only, about 95% of the commercial airline departures. 

Now former FAA Administrator Marion Blakey said recently, “I think it’s fair to say that this is the safest period in the history of aviation.” (See Figure A ) This article will show how aggregating data from all National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)-investigated Part 121 accidents in the nine year period could help focus the best way to continue to reduce accidents even more in the future.

The safety improvement goals adopted by the FAA are an outgrowth of the 1997 White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, chaired at the time by Vice President Al Gore. The Commission recommended that the fatal accident rate for airlines should be reduced “by a factor of five over ten years.” This goal was the genesis of the 80% rate of improvement.

In fiscal years 1994-1996 there were 16 fatal accidents where 800 people were killed. The accidents included ten loss of control in flight events, such as a fuel tank explosion, an in-flight cargo fire, an uncommanded rudder reversal precipitated by wake turbulence, in-flight icing, a propeller separation, a windshear-related failed go-around, a failed stall recovery on approach, two controlled flight into terrain accidents, and a runway collision with another aircraft.

Out of this dismal record was born the challenge to do better.

First, the 80% fatal accident reduction challenge
As indicated, with 16 fatal accidents in the three years before, that works out to 5.3 fatal accidents per year. To meet the reduction goal, there could only be an average of one or two fatal accidents a year by 2007. Sticking to Part 121 aircraft only, as of 30 September 2006, there have been 18 fatal accidents in nine years (see Figure B ). This is a two-a-year average. At the 1994-1996 pace, there would have been at least 48 accidents. Most individuals would regard this as a noteworthy improvement. Behind the aggregate achievement, certain patterns bear comment:

• The number of accidents per fiscal year varied from one to four and averaged two. Significantly, the trend is up with four accidents in FY 2006.
• Six of the 16 fatal accidents from FY 94-96 involved regional airliners. Eight were involved in the 18 fatal accidents from FY 98-06.
• Three of 16 fatal accidents from FY 94-96 involved cargo operations; two of 18 from FY 98-06 involved cargo. However, three additional cargo aircraft were destroyed in landing accidents without severe injuries or fatalities.
• Where there were three approach/landing/controlled flight into terrain accidents with 184 fatalities in FY 94-96, there were four in FY 98-06 with 26 fatalities. The dramatic improvement may stem from the advent of improved warning systems of threatened impact with the ground in the form of enhanced ground proximity warning systems (EGPWS).
• There was one windshear, one uncontained engine failure and one runway incursion collision with fatalities in FY 94-96 and no similar accidents in FY 98-06.
• There was one wrong runway takeoff, one turbulence and one ground evacuation fatal accident in FY 97-06 and no similar accidents in FY 94-96.
• The airport operations fatal accident trend is up. There was one ground worker fatality from a propeller strike in FY 94-96, but from FY 97-06 there were six, three killed by propeller strikes, two from vehicle-aircraft collisions, and one from being ingested into a jet engine. One wonders if this unfortunate trend results from the increased flight schedules, a cutback in ramp staffing and/or a lack of effective oversight. 
• At the nine year point, the industry has attained slightly better than an 80% reduction in total fatalities This conclusion is based on the fact that there were 800 Part 121 airline fatalities in FY 94-96 (267 per year) compared to 478 killed from FY 98-06 (53 per year). Only eight of the 18 fatal accidents had multiple fatalities. This is a noteworthy achievement, but, unfortunately, the challenge called for a reduction of “fatal accidents per million departures.”  A single fatality counts the same as 263.

A more detailed look at overall Part 121 accidents
A Part 121 accident occurs when the first person embarks with intent for flight and the last person disembarks. An accident must involve at least substantial damage to the aircraft or severe injuries to persons. There were 408 total accidents (fatal and nonfatal) found on the NTSB database from 1 October 1997 through 30 September 2006 (see Figure C ).

In these 408 accidents, there were 12 destroyed aircraft, 234 substantially damaged aircraft, 478 fatalities and 298 seriously injured persons.  Total hypothetical direct cost of the accidents amounts to more than $700 million.  The NTSB cited flight crew error in about 26% of all the events. There were 249 accidents from FY98-02 (50 per year average) and 160 (40 per year) from FY03-06, a significant reduction of 20% in overall accidents during the last nine years.  The overall trend is down.  (See Figure B ).

Within this total, there are both some hopeful and challenging phenomena:

• The overall trend with respect to aircraft system malfunction accidents is down. However, flight crews were presented with unlandable aircraft five times, resulting in fatalities. There were 53 (10+/year) aircraft systems accidents from FY97-02 and 28 (7/year) from FY 03-06, a 30% reduction in the nine year period.. 
• Approach and landing (ALAR) and controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) accidents are down and the fatality numbers are low. In FY 94-96 there were 184 ALAR/CFIT fatalities and only 24 from FY 97-06. There have been no CFIT fatal accidents with the new EGPWS/TAWS (enhanced ground proximity warning system/terrain avoidance warning system) equipped aircraft, showing that the intelligent application of technology can make flying safer. There were 9+/year ALAR/CFIT accidents from FY98-02 and 6+/year from FY 03-06, a 33% reduction.  The Flight Safety Foundation and Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) intervention recommendations and implementation activities seem to be taking affect to reduce landing accidents.
• For airport operations, the threat of fatal and hull loss accidents remains high, especially when considering mandatory non-accident runway incursion reports. The Flight Safety Foundation has a worldwide apron accident prevention project underway, which is beginning to take effect. Most of the damage and injuries occur at the terminal gate. There were also many taxi collisions, bird strikes and runway incursion collisions with animals and objects.  There were 82 (16+/year) airport accidents from FY 98-03 and 62 (15+/year) from FY 03-06, very little improvement.  Suffice to say that in the U.S., the 144 fatal and non-fatal accidents in this category lead the pack in frequency, and improvement is needed.
• Atmospheric accidents involve en route weather, convective and clear air turbulence and wake turbulence events. Avoiding wake turbulence is an emerging threat with increasing traffic, decreasing altitude separations and tighter terminal area separation and routing required. Though the risk of injury is more acute for flight attendants, the fatal accident over the Pacific Ocean also involved 50 serious passenger injuries. Of the 164 injuries in this category, 75 passengers and 89 flight attendants were seriously injured. From FY 98-02 there were 70 passengers injured in 65 (13/year)events and in FY 03-06 there were only 5 passengers seriously injured in 43(10+/year) events. Though airlines have made great progress forecasting en route turbulence and improving procedures, clearly, more needs to be done, especially in reducing injuries to flight attendants.  A display showing clear air and wake turbulence with adequate warning time in the cockpit would help.
• Administrator and airline concern accidents involve direct federal aviation regulations (FAR) violations, such as horseplay and other matters involving uncompleted paperwork. The two accidents in this report involve one commuter flight where there were no passengers and the flight crew went under the radar and flew into power lines en route. The other is a paperwork oversight or extension of international courtesy where the information necessary for studying or making recommendations on an accident is still not available several years after the event. In both cases, the FAA administrator and the airline should be the principal interested party for taking action.

Using Data for the Future Reduction of Part 121 accidents.
No matter the outcome on 1 October 2007, the Part 121 airlines, industry and associations in partnership with the FAA, have of reduced fatalities in airline accidents by 80% in ten years. According to former FAA Administrator, Marion Blakey, mostly due to single fatality airport worker accidents, the goal to reduce the number of fatal accidents per 1 million departures by 80% will not be met. As indicated in recent remarks by former Administrator Blakey, the FAA wants the future goal to reduce fatalities per 100,000,000 persons on board by 50% by 2025.  I see that as difficult for the public to perceive, as few people have a good mental picture of a number like 100,000,000 but they can count accidents.

What is clear from the data amassed thus far is that work to further reduce accidents falls into clear categories (see Figures C and D ).

The Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), a joint effort by the FAA and industry, has set its plans for interventions to reduce accidents based on hull loss, fatal and some foreign accidents that seem to have high potential for future accident experience of all kinds.  CAST has been highly successful and has introduced resulting cost savings into the mix.  The Flight Safety Foundation has recently announced they favor using NTSB’s definition of a major accident, which suggests goal-setting based on destroyed aircraft, multiple fatality and/or single fatality and substantially damaged aircraft accidents (www.fsf.org).

Based on the data in the NTSB accident and incident database for all Part 121 accidents, the CAST process works and should be retained in the future with a new set of goals incorporating all accidents. Because of economic factors involved in hull losses without injuries or fatalities, the NTSB major accident rate per departure should be the reduction goal rather than fatal accident only rates which includes single fatalities. Overall accidents by major areas of concern should also have specific reduction goals. 

Understandable data such as days between accidents or types of accidents per year should be made readily available to keep the stakeholders and public aware of progress.  Meaningful dollar figures per accident should be calculated, revealed and added to the mix to focus the goals most effectively.  Prioritized data over the last nine years to show where intervention efforts might do the most good (see Figure D ).  All accident events listed involved fatalities, hull losses, highest frequency of similar events or occurred on average more than once a year. 

Some types of accident risk can be reduced with little effort or expense, others may need many more dollars than they would save, but all deserve continuing effective accident risk reduction efforts.  That is what the data tells us.

Capt. Duke is a former aviation safety researcher for the NTSB.   He was a B-707 captain and check airman for Independent Air and was director of safety for the Air Force Reserve.  A graduate of Dartmouth College, he also has an M.S. in systems management from USC. He has over 30 articles published on Air Line Safety.          Email This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it g

Figure A (back)
FAA Administrator Marion Blakey on Safety Goals
Extracts of ‘Town Hall’ meeting of the former Administrator with FAA officials 6 September

Our accident reduction goal has been a very tough one to hit. Set in 1997, it calls for an 80% reduction in fatal commercial accidents, and even ramp accidents involving only a single individual count the same as a major crash. So we’re somewhat shy of that one but, I think it’s fair to say that this is the safest period in the history of aviation. In the five years of the Flight Plan, we moved more than three billion people safely – the equivalent of ten times the population of the United State. There are keys to our success: we’re better at pilot training, better at launching technology and better at controlling the system.

Let’s look at GA. There have been 284 fatal accidents, versus a not-to-exceed ceiling of 331 for the year. We’re recording the lowest-ever number of rotorcraft accidents since we began measuring them.

And with its challenging terrain and weather, Alaska has long been a focus for us. It’s had a significant decrease in accidents this year. With 74 of them so far this year, the number remains well below the not-to-exceed ceiling of 95.

Those numbers need context. Over a decade ago, we set tough safety improvement goals for general aviation. With the work of the Government/Industry General Aviation Joint Steering Committee, we’ve made a real difference … we’ve updated training and advisory materials for new pilots flying technically advanced aircraft. We’ve put out materials for flight instructors to use to focus on critical weather information; a guide for pilots to use when evaluating operation in weather conditions and a Safety Alert for Operators [SAFO] on best practices for aircraft deicing …

So while we can’t point to a particular piece of information that has prevented an accident – we do know that over the life of the Flight Plan we have taken the right steps to accomplish our accident reduction goal for GA.

Since Lexington [the crash of Comair flight 5191 in August 2006], runways have come under quite a bit of scrutiny and, quite frankly, we welcome that. Intensity brings focus, and focus, as Nick Sabatini [associate FAA administrator for aviation safety] says, is the springboard to safety. While we’ve reduced the most serious types of runway incursion each year since 2003, there’s been an increase in the lesser, more technical violations. That’s a warning sign that warranted a call to action. So last month, we convened all the parties – the airlines, the controllers, the pilots, the airports and the alphabets [presumably, a reference to various FAA office codes] – and charged them to come up with a list of actions that could take place immediately. They’ve done so, and we expect much of it to be delivered within 60 days. That type of cooperation builds safety.

Now another trend I’m very proud of is the reduction by our controllers in operational errors. As you know, we’re working on training for controllers to reduce operational errors and runway incursions. This new training will be given over the next year. …

With that … Next year’s revised Flight Plan maintains the forward momentum we have built over the last five years, but with a few changes to meet the challenges of the future.…

First, we’ll be using a new performance metric for commercial air carrier safety – fatalities per 100 million persons on board. This new metric is more relevant to the flying public because it’s a better measure of individual risk. The numbers are so small now that we must focus on incremental long-term progress. The long-term target is no less audacious – we aim to cut the risk in half by 2025. We are currently at 8.8 fatalities per 100 million persons on board, and we will focus our efforts to get to 4.4 fatalities by 2025. [Emphasis added]

The second revision is Operational Errors. … Unlike the previous method, which relied on factors such as flight paths or the subjective measure of whether the aircraft was under air traffic control, our new measurement process, referred to as the “Separation Conformance,” is objective. It determines (t)he severity of an operational error based on the closest proximity of the two aircraft and the percent of required separation that was maintained. Technology now gives us the ability to track separation in 100th of-a-mile increments, and our metrics need to change to keep up with technology. We think this will be much more accurate and useful to our controllers and supervisors. …” (The full test of Administrator Blakey’s remarks may be viewed at www.faa.gov/news/speeches/news_story.cfm?newsld=9492)

Figure B (back)

Figure C (back)

Figure D (back)